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States closely monitor their surrounding territories. When a military block ex-
pands its membership to include countries next to a rival state's borders, those rivals feel 
threatened and tend to respond. One of the ways states respond to losing influence over 
their border-states, which are not only their direct spheres of influence but serve as a pro-
tective buffer zone, is by declaring that their national or ethnic minorities who live in 
these territories are in danger. The likely result is that states will interfere in these border 
nations on behalf of ethnic minorities.  
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been warning that it perceives NATO 
enlargement eastward as a threat to national security. After Moscow's "soft" balancing 
strategy towards NATO of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s did not bring the desired 
outcome, the Kremlin turned to much more coercive policies towards its neighboring 
states, which had sought NATO membership. The Five-Day War between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis took place only after Georgia 
and Ukraine made concrete steps towards NATO membership and served as a balancing 
strategy for Russia towards the Alliance's enlargement. This perceived threat is the root 
cause of the Kremlin's intervention in post-Soviet states on behalf of the Russian dias-
pora. In this light, the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia of August 2008 and the 






"Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by interna-
tional law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their 
exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can 
ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, 
building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us… 
They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accom-
plished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of mil-
itary infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not con-
cern you."1 
Vladimir Putin (speaking on Russia’s recognition of Crimea, 2014) 
 
"The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the 
Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots 





 The current Ukrainian crisis brings back memories of the Five-Day War between 
Russia and Georgia of 2008. In both conflicts, Moscow intervened militarily into sover-
eign states—located in Russia's historic sphere of influence, yet, today seeking European 
integration and NATO membership—to protect Russian minorities. Was it an unjustified 
act of aggression and a clear manifestation of Moscow's revisionist aims? Or, was it an 
act of self-preservation against the impending threat of the military alliance's tremendous 
expansion? This thesis argues that Russia perceived NATO enlargement as a threat to na-
tional security. This perceived threat is the root cause of the Kremlin's intervention in 
post-Soviet states on behalf of the Russian diaspora. Feeling threatened by the possibility 
                                                
1 Masha Lipman, "How Putin Plays With the Law," New Yorker, March 19, 2014, ac-
cessed December 8, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-putin-plays-
with-the-law . 
2 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, The Kremlin, Mos-
cow, April 25, 2005, accessed December 8, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presi-
dent/transcripts/22931 . 
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of Georgia and Ukraine becoming NATO members, Russia used the idea of protecting its 
compatriots abroad as an excuse to interfere in these two neighboring countries.  
Russia's behavior illustrates a larger phenomenon. When a military alliance ex-
pands next to the borders of non-member-states, neighboring states feel increasingly 
threatened. Under certain conditions, states will respond to these threats with strategies 
designed to counterbalance the expanding alliance. Here, I show that Russia's military in-
terventions in Georgia and Ukraine are an attempt to balance NATO expansion into states 
that Russia perceives as strategically important. 






tion	of	its	sphere	of	influence	and	an	act	of	defense,	of	the	Russian diaspora abroad. 
These minority populations therefore serve as a valuable policy instrument in ensuring 
Moscow's security interests.  
 Before providing the main analysis, I explain the importance of Georgia and 
Ukraine for Russia's security, and why their possible NATO membership is perceived as 
a threat by the Kremlin, in accordance with Stephen Walt's four sources of threat. Fur-
ther, I explain Russia's balancing strategy towards NATO expansion in accordance with 
the neorealist idea of four different balancing strategies, shaped by the level of threat per-
ception regarding the state’s adversary. The current project is divided by time periods: 
6 
first, I describe Soviet balancing strategies towards NATO; second, I examine Russia's 
balancing strategy after the end of the Cold War, followed by elaboration of the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia of 1999 as a turning point of Russia-West relations; third, I de-
scribe Moscow's balancing strategy towards NATO after Vladimir Putin came to power; 
and fourth, I analyze the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia as the first clear sig-
nal of Russian balancing against NATO expansion through the use of force. Finally, I ex-
plain why the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis is the latest example of such Moscow mil-
itary balancing strategy. In both conflicts, protection of Russian minorities residing in 

















 Traditionally, alliance literature has mainly focused on two questions: Why do al-
liances form? And, what keeps alliances together?3 There is a gap in the literature on how 
alliance enlargement affects nonmember states. Expansion of a military alliance next to 
the borders of a non-member-state is a sign of future unrest. This is likely even if the lat-
ter is a great power. My research will attempt to address this gap within alliance litera-
ture. 
 I derive my argument from Walt. Walt changed Waltz's balance-of-power theory, 
according to which states align with (or against) the most powerful states by balancing 
against countries that are not only powerful, but threatening.4 His theory became known 
as the balance-of-threat theory, and many political scientists have further developed this 
(Schweller,5 He,6 Sprecher,7 Kimball,8 Bock and Henneberg9).  
                                                
3 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organiza-
tion 50, no. 3 (1996): 445. 
4 Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th ed. (New York: R.R. 
Donnelley and Sons, 2012), 65. 
5 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
6 Kai He, "Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative Bal-
ancing Strategies after the Cold War," Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 154-191. 
7 Christopher Sprecher, "Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Ap-
proaches and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 4 (2006): 363-369. 
8 Anessa Kimball, "Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation," 
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 407-419. 
9 Andreas Bock and Ingo Henneberg, "Why Balancing Fails: Theoretical Reflections on 
Stephan M. Walt’s 'Balance of Threat' Theory," Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Poli-
tik und Außenpolitik, no. 2 (2013), accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.jaeger.uni-
koeln.de/fileadmin/templates/publikationen/aipa/AIPA_2_2013.pdf . 
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 Randall Schweller, in line with Walt's balance-of-threat theory, suggests that "bal-
ancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization 
or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or the political and 
military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition.10" However, Kai He 
points out that military alliances and arms buildups are not the only balancing strategies 
states can use.11 Andreas M. Bock and Ingo Henneberg agree with He’s points, defining 
balancing as "a state strategy designed to counter a perceived external threat by either 
military or nonmilitary means that are internal or external and that aim to reduce threat 
and maintain security."12 
 The current project narrows the focus on balances and alliances between Russia 
and NATO. The balance-of-threat theory can be used to explain Russia's balancing strat-
egy towards the Alliance's enlargement. Most of the Western literature on Russia's for-
eign policy blames the Kremlin for the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in 
2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis, calling Russian actions aggressive 
                                                
10 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 166. 
11 He, "Undermining Adversaries," 156. 
12 Bock and Henneberg, "Why Balancing Fails," 9. 
9 
(King,13 Budjerun,14 Galeotti15). However, some literature calls the Kremlin's foreign pol-
icy rational, explainable, and logical (Roberts,16 Mead,17 Gibler,18 Steff and Khoo19). Ac-
cording to Mearshimer, the West, not Russia, is responsible for the Ukrainian crisis. Spe-
cifically, he argues that the root of this conflict is NATO enlargement.20 The author de-
clares great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their borders. NATO 
tried to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border, threatening Moscow's 
core strategic interests. Mearshimer asks the reader: "Imagine the outrage in Washington 
if China built a military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it?"21 Hence, 
Moscow's balancing strategy towards NATO enlargement should come as no surprise. 
                                                
13 Charles King, "The Five-Day War. Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis," For-
eign Affairs 87, no. 6 (2008): 2-11. 
14 Marianna Budjerun, "Did the West Provoke Putin? Apologists and Facts," World Af-
fairs, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/did-west-
provoke-putin-apologists-and-facts . 
15 Mark Galeotti, "Putin’s Chaos Strategy Is Coming Back to Bite Him in the Ass," For-
eign Policy, October 26, 2016, accessed December 8, 2016, http://foreignpol-
icy.com/2016/10/26/putins-chaos-strategy-is-coming-back-to-bite-him-in-the-ass/ . 
16 Paul Craig Roberts , "Vladimir Putin Is the Only Leader the West Has," Foreign Policy 
Journal, July 15, 2016, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.foreignpolicyjour-
nal.com/2016/07/15/vladimir-putin-is-the-only-leader-the-west-has/ . 
17 Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist 
Powers," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 69-79. 
18 Douglas Gibler, "East or Further East?" Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 6 (1999): 
627-637. 
19 Reuben Steff and Nicholas Khoo, "Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolar-
ity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administra-
tion (2001–2008)," Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014): 222-258.   
20 John Mearshimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 
5 (2014): 82. 
21 Ibid. 
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 The view of literature published in Russia is that Moscow is protecting its na-
tional interests against NATO's aggression. In the beginning of the 21st century, there 
was hope that NATO and Russia could become equal partners (Golubeva22, Kalachev and 
Polulyakh23). Yet, the illusion quickly vanished. Today, the Russian government per-
ceives NATO as a direct and immediate threat to security, particularly in light of NATO 
deploying an antimissile system right next to Russia's ( Kozin24 and Giniyatov25). 
 Sergei Voronin26 and Elena Garbuzarova27 claim that, for the last five hundred 
years, it has been the Western mission to "kill the Russian bear."28 In Voronin's eyes, it 
has been a long-standing dream of Western politicians, such as Halford Mackinder, 
Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, to organize and provoke a war in the Slavic 
                                                
22 Julia Golubeva, "Problema Ozenki Rezultativnosti Sotrudnichestva v Otnosheniah 
Rossiya-NATO" [The Problem of Assessing the Effectiveness of Cooperation in NATO-
Russia Relations], Vlast, no. 5 (2011): 81-84. 
23 Dmitri Kalachev and Dmitri Polylyah, "Osnovnie Protivorechia v Sisteme Otnoshenii 
Rossiya - NATO" [The Main Contradictioni in the System of Relations between Russia 
and NATO], Izvestia MGTU MAMI, no. 3 (2014): 93-98. 
24 Vladimir Kozin,"Globalnyie Ambitsii NATO" [NATO Global Ambitions], Krasnaya 
Zvezda, May 24, 2012, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.redstar.ru/in-
dex.php/newspaper/item/2483-globalnyie-ambitsii-nato . 
25 Farit Giniyatov, "Rasshirenie NATO na Vostok I Poziziya Rossiyi" [Expansion of 
NATO in the East and the Position of Russia], Vestnik Ekonomiki, Prava i Sociologii, no. 
1 (2012): 176-178. 
26 Sergey Voronin, "Rasshirenie NATO na Vostok. Zelyatsa v Ykrainy, a Popadayt v 
Rossiy" [NATO Enlargement Eastward. Aiming at Ukraine, Hitting Russia], Vestnik Ros-
siyskogo Yniversiteta Dryzhbi Narodov, no. 2 (2014): 7. 
27 Elena Garbuzarova, "Rossiyskaya Ugroza Postsovetskomu Prostranstvu: Mif ili 
Real'nost'?" [Russian Threat to the Post-Soviet Space: Myth or Reality?], Istoricheskaya i 
Sotsial'no-obrazovatel'naya Mysl 8, no. 2 (2016): 16. 
28 Voronin, "Rasshirenie NATO," 7. 
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world, in order to, for example "by the hands" of Ukraine, start a confrontation with Rus-
sia.29 These political scientists believe that the current Ukrainian crisis is just the latest 
attempt of this Western mission.  
 Elena Garbuzarova joins Voronin's argument by adding that there is a substantial 
growth of activity of NATO near the Russian borders, giving Moscow the right to protect 
its national security.30 Angelina Ivashkina's work focuses on military bases of NATO, 
which are gradually surrounding Russia.31 Except maintaining NATO presence in the tra-
ditional areas of the Alliance's influence, such as Western Europe, the bases are increas-
ing NATO presence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
 One of the latest works devoted to Moscow's policies towards the Russian dias-
pora abroad is Agnia Grigas' Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire. The author de-
clares that "Russian history is a history of empire,"32 and the Russian diaspora abroad has 
become the instrument of Moscow's new-imperial aims and a tool to challenge the sover-
eignty of post-Soviet states.33 In Grigas' eyes, Moscow's hold on Russian minorities 
abroad serves as a pretext for the Kremlin's expansionist foreign policy.34 Furthermore, 
                                                
29 Ibid., 8.  
30 Garbuzarova, "Rossiyskaya Ugroza," 17. 
31 Angelina Ivashkina, "Geopoliticheskiy Analiz Otnoshenyi Rossyii i NATO" [Geopolit-
ical Analysis of NATO-Russia Relations], Vestnik Penzenskogo Gosugarstvennogo Yni-
versiteta 11, no. 3 (2015): 77. 
32 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (London: Yale University 
Press, 2016), 12. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
34 Ibid. 
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the aim of the latter is to "opportunistically grab land and gradually rebuild its historic 
empire when domestic and international conditions are favorable."35  
 This project disagrees with her main argument about aggressive imperialist poli-
cies of the Russian Federation. The main argument here is that states closely monitor 
their surrounding territories. When a military block expands its membership to include 
countries next to a rival state's borders, those rivals feel threatened and tend to respond. 
One of the ways states respond to losing influence over their border-states, which are not 
only their direct spheres of influence but serve as a protective buffer zone, is by declaring 
that their national or ethnic minorities who live in these territories are in danger. The 
likely result is that states will interfere in these border nations on behalf of ethnic minori-
ties. Thus, Russia's interference in Ukraine and Georgia are rather caused by Russia's fear 
of NATO expansion and self-preservation than desire to rebuild the Russian Empire. The 
Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian 
crisis took place only after Georgia and Ukraine made concrete steps towards NATO 








                                                
35 Ibid., 9. 
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3 ARGUMENT	 	
	 In this section, I develop an argument about how states react to the expansion of 
national security alliances. The latter play a central and constant phenomenon in interna-
tional relations.36  As Liska stated, "it is impossible to speak of international relations 
without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name."37  
 According to Walt, alliances are most commonly viewed as "a strategic response 
to external threats."38 When entering an alliance, states may either ally in opposition to 
the principal source of danger or ally with the state that poses the major threat.39 The dis-
tinguishing character of alliance is that states will ally with or against the most threaten-
ing power.  
 However, alliance formation generates a security dilemma. As states endeavor to 
protect their interests, other countries respond. This is especially true of formal alliances. 
When a military alliance expands next to its adversaries' borders, rival states in the region 
feel an increased threat. One strategy adversaries in the region may pursue is balancing 
against the expanding alliance. Balancing typically involves forming a competing alli-
ance to counterbalance against the principal source of threat. However, balancing is not 
limited only to joining another alliance or, indeed, to building up arms. Balancing can 
also refer to any state strategy that aims to reduce a perceived threat by improving its own 
                                                
36 Stefan Bergsmann, "The Concept of Military Alliance," accessed December 8, 2016, 
http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/05_small_states_04.pdf . 
37 George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 3. 
38 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 65. 
39 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Powers," Interna-
tional security 9, no. 4 (1985): 4. 
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security situation.40 It occurs commonly in history, dating back to the Peloponnesian war 
(431 - 404 BCE) and, as I argue, through to the present day Ukrainian crisis. 
 When do states balance and what kinds of policy strategies do they pursue? States' 
strategies are informed by two issues — the likely effectiveness of the strategy and its 
costs.41 These factors do not influence states equally. When states are exposed to greater 
threats, they are more likely to weight the effectiveness over the cost of balancing strate-
gies. This is because the increased threat poses a more imminent risk to the rival state, 
and the relative costs of protecting their own interests decrease.  
 Balancing can take on several forms, either “hard” or “soft” (through military or 
nonmilitary means) and can be positive (directed to strengthen a state’s own power in 
world politics) or negative (directed against the threatening state).42 Thus, one can cate-
gorize four different balancing strategies which are shaped by the level of threat percep-
tion regarding the state’s adversary43:  
1. Internal or positive nonmilitary balancing. For example, strategic technol-
ogy transfer and strategic economic aid to allies. An example of this is President 
Truman's policy of providing economic aid to countries threatened by com-
munism or totalitarian ideology, such as Greece and Turkey. 
                                                
40 Andreas Bock, Ingo Henneberg, and Friedrich Plank, "If You Compress the Spring, It 
Will Snap Back Hard: The Ukrainian Crisis and the Balance of Threat Theory," Interna-
tional Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 70, no. 1 (2015): 101. 
41 He, "Undermining Adversaries," 169. 
42 Bock and Henneberg, "Why Balancing Fails," 9. 
43 He, "Undermining Adversaries," 170. 
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2. External or negative nonmilitary balancing. This includes, for example, 
trade embargos, strategic non-cooperation, and economic sanctions such as those 
against Russia, Iran, and Cuba. 
3. Internal or positive military balancing. For example, this might entail arms 
races like those during the Cold War, military mobilizations, and alliance forma-
tion.  
4. External or negative military balancing. For example, detaching or alienat-
ing a rival’s allies, arms sales to the "enemy of the enemy," and arms control ef-
forts targeting the enemy. Kissinger’s detente strategy toward Russia and China 
during the Cold War is one example of alienating a rival’s allies.44 
Table 1. The Typology of State Balancing Strategies 
~~~ Nonmilitary (soft) balancing  Military (hard) balancing 
Internal (positive)  
balancing 
Internal nonmilitary balancing Internal military balancing 
External (negative)  
balancing 





 Thus, there are a variety of ways in which states can balance against an external 
threat. As I note, these vary in their costliness. States normally do not want to provoke 
                                                
44 Ibid., 166. 
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their rivals by military means. This leads to escalation and raises the risks to both sides. 
When a military alliance expands in a rival state’s neighborhood, this state's first step is 
likely to be some nonmilitary means, such as coercive diplomacy, in order to prevent the 
enlargement. If a military alliance continues to expand into what the threatened state con-
siders to be its natural sphere of influence, the state's strategy then might start including 
positive military balancing, such as military buildup and even use of force.  
 One of the conditions under which states balance against expanding alliances is 
when they are compelled to protect their national or ethnic minorities living elsewhere. 
This behavior occurs when the expansion of an alliance includes countries with strong 
ethnic minorities related to the rival state. 
 States have a particular interest in protecting their minority populations in foreign 
countries. It has been noted that "a ‘kin-state’ with strong ethnic, cultural, religious, or 
linguistic links to a minority population abroad, may be well-placed to assist in its minor-
ities' protection."45 Yet, states can treat the protection of rights and interests of their mi-
norities abroad much more as an instrument of securing leadership in the neighboring ter-
ritories rather than as a goal in itself.46 States might interfere into bordering states not 
only in order to protect their minorities from genocide or ethnic cleansing, but to achieve 
their own goals, such as protecting their own territory from the unrests in the neighboring 
states, influencing internal politics of the latter, creating frozen conflicts and using them 
                                                
45 Nicholas Turner and Nanako Otsuki, "The Responsibility to Protect Minorities and the 
Problem of the Kin-State," ICRtoP, April 2010, accessed December 8, 2016, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
topics/2778-the-responsibility-to-protect-minorities-and-the-problem-of-the-kin-state . 
46 Igor Zevelev, "Russia’s Policy Toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union," Rus-
sia in Global Affairs 6, no. 1 (2008): 55.  
17 
as Trojan horses for their own benefits, or stopping the neighboring states from joining 
military alliances. Overall, states see infringements on their bordering territories as a par-
ticularly salient threat. These states' perceptions of threat can be explained by Walt’s four 
sources of threat:
1. Aggregate power: the greater a state's total resources (such as, population, industrial 
and military capability), the greater of a potential threat it can pose to others.47 Thus, 
the more members in an alliance, the more capabilities it possesses. 
2. Proximity: because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are 
nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.48 Hence, the closer the alliance 
to the non-member state, the more threatened the latter feels. 
3. Offensive capability: states and alliances with large offensive capabilities are more 
likely to provoke others.49 The high mobility of military capabilities is an example of 
alliances' offensive power.  
4. Offensive intentions: states or alliances that appear aggressive are likely to provoke oth-
ers to balance against them.50 Growth of an alliance is definitely a sign of its offensive 
intentions.
                                                
47 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 22. 
48 Ibid., 23. 
49 Ibid., 24. 
50 Ibid., 25. 
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 The result is that we will see states declaring that their minorities are in danger and that 
they have the right to protect their compatriots. If "soft balancing" of diplomatic statements in 
the United Nations Security Council, a negative nonmilitary balancing strategy, is not sufficient 
enough, the states can move from words to actions.51 
 First, these states can provide strategic technology transfer and strategic economic aid to 
their minorities residing abroad, a positive, non-military balancing strategy. Second, they can 
switch to negative, military balancing, such as "divide-and-conquer" strategies or military sup-
port to separatist rebels in these neighboring states. Finally, if the states' perception of threat has 
reached its highest point and no other balancing strategy has stopped the alliance's enlargement, 
the threatened states can occupy these surrounding territories where their ethnic minorities are 
living: a positive military balancing strategy. The further escalation of the conflict can even lead 
to a full scale war.  
 I argue that this latter strategy is happening today between NATO and Russia. My hy-
potheses is that Russia's military interference to protect Russian citizens and compatriots residing 
in former Soviet states is a way to balance NATO expansion into states that Russia perceives as 






                                                
51 Nathan A. Sears, "China, Russia, and the Long Unipolar Moment," The Diplomat, April 27, 





 My research consists of a case study of Russia's perception of NATO enlargement as a 
security threat, and Russia's strategies of protecting Russian minorities in Georgia and Ukraine in 
order to balance the Alliance's expansion. Testing my argument through a case study will help 
me, paraphrasing Halperin and Heath, to develop arguments that are relevant to other contexts, 
and say not only something important about the case in question, but also declare something 
meaningful about general political phenomena.52  
 I chose the case of Russia vs. NATO enlargement for a couple of reasons. First, it is a 
strikingly strong example of how a military alliance expansion next to an adversaries' borders 
causes fears in these rival states and pushes the latter to respond. For example, the Russian Na-
tional Security Strategy of December 2015 declared:  
The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of inter-
national law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expan-
sion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian bor-
ders are creating a threat to national security.53 
 Second, the conflict between NATO and Russia is contemporary and highly salient. The 
Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia took place only in 2008, while the Ukrainian crisis is 
still unfolding, having begun in 2014. Today, some of the post-Soviet states officially declare 
                                                
52 Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 205. 
53 Russian National Security Strategy, The Kremlin, Moscow, December 31, 2015, accessed De-




that they fear Moscow's focus on Russian minorities living in neighboring states.54 As such, ten-
sions have already been generated between Russia and three Baltic states. Latvian Defense Min-
ister, Raimonds Vejonis, declared that "Russia is trying to use the Russian-speaking minority as 
a tool to aggressively promote its objectives."55 While Russian Foreign Ministry announced that 
"there are whole segments of the Russian world" that might require Russia's protection, they sin-
gled out Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia by saying that Russia would not tolerate an "offensive" 






 This research employs a variety of data-gathering strategies, such as policy documents, 
work by prominent political analysts, speeches and statements by Russian and Western politi-
cians. Throughout the work, I try to follow an unbiased approach. The Russian and Western de-
                                                
54 Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and Daniel Antoun, "Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, 
Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union," CNA, November 2015, accessed December 
8, 2016, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-011689-1Rev.pdf . 
55 Michael Birnbaum, "In Latvia, Fresh Fears of Aggression as Kremlin Warns about Russian 
Minorities," The Washington Post, September, 27, 2014, accessed December 8, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-latvia-fresh-fears-of-aggression-as-kremlin-
warns-about-russian-minorities/2014/09/26/b723b1af-2aed-44d1-a791-38cebbbadbd0_story.html  
56 Anna Dolgov, "Russia Sees Need to Protect Russian Speakers in NATO Baltic States," The 





scriptions of the Five-Day War between Georgia and Russia and the current Ukrainian crisis dif-
fer widely and are highly politicized. Thus, taking into consideration these contrary viewpoints 
on NATO's enlargement and protection of Russian minorities in post-Soviet states, I look 
through both Western and Russian sources of information and try to reach independent conclu-
sions.  
 
4.1 Georgia and Ukraine’s Importance  
 The histories of Russia and Ukraine are deeply interconnected. Both states originated 
from Kievan Rus, founded in approximately 879,57 and until this day Kiev, the capital of 
Ukraine, has been called "the mother of all Russian cities."58 In the 12th century, the first cul-
tural, economic and political ties between Georgia and Kievan Rus took place.59 Yet, the im-
portance of Ukraine and Georgia for Russia lies not only in their deep historic ties, but in the fact 
that both countries are vital for Russia's security interests. Bearing in mind Walt’s four sources 
of threat and the fact that Russia is not considered an Alliance member in the future, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion eastward is perceived by Russia as threatening. Why? 
First and foremost, by accepting these two post-Soviet states as members, NATO will greatly en-
large its border-territory with Russia. The latter already borders five NATO members (Norway, 
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Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), equivalent to 1,215 kilometers of borderland.60 If NATO 
accepts three more states—Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan—the border between Russia and 
NATO will effectively double in size.61 
 The geographic position of Georgia and Ukraine is critically important for Russia. The 
Caucasus represent the boundary between Russia and Turkey. The region constitutes the barrier 
that Russia must dominate in order to be safe from the political and religious unrests of the Mid-
dle East.62 By losing its position in the Caucasus, Russia puts itself in strategic trouble by creat-
ing a territorial security gap between Ukraine and Kazakhstan a few hundred miles wide.63 
Whereby, keeping Georgia under Russia's control or at least not letting it become a member of 
any military alliance, is vital to Moscow. 
 Ukraine is more important to Russia than any other post-Soviet state, or, as George Fried-
man in his book The Next 100 Years puts it, "Ukraine is everything to Russia."64 Territorially, 
Ukraine is less than two hundred miles from Russia's Volgograd (former Stalingrad). Thereby, if 
Kiev joins a military alliance that is a Russia's rivalry, Ukraine will cease to function as Mos-
cow's long-standing buffer zone, and "Russia would be in mortal danger."65 Russia defended 
against Napoleon and Hitler "with depth. Without Ukraine, there is no depth, no land to trade for 
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an enemy’s blood."66 Ukraine becoming a member of a military alliance means that this alli-
ance's military bases will be in close proximity to Russia's borders.  
 Second, by adding Georgia and Ukraine's population, industrial and military capabilities, 
the Alliance's aggregate power will raise. The population of Ukraine is 44,209,733 people,67 
thus, if Ukraine stays under Russian domination, Moscow adds this amount of people "to its own 
Western-oriented demography, and suddenly challenges Europe."68 Otherwise, NATO will have 
this advantage. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had better prospects for success-
ful economic development than any other Soviet state, including Russia. Kiev inherited not only 
great agricultural resources, port and shipbuilding facilities, a machinery sector, and highly 
skilled workforce, but one-third of the Soviet defense industry.69 Yet, Ukraine was not able to 
use all these advantages for its own benefit. Today, the industrial and military capabilities of 
Ukraine leave much to be desired. However, with the Western investments, which NATO states 
can provide Kiev with, the latter can return to its full potential. As such, Georgia, a small country 
of less than five million people, already received hundreds of millions of dollars from the US for 
reforming its military during 2000s.70 Having a good technical and industrial basis, Ukraine can 
become NATO’s stronghold on the Russia’s border. 
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 Third, one of the biggest offensive capabilities that Ukraine possesses, or possessed prior 
to the Ukrainian crisis, is Crimea. The latter has always been not only regarded by Russians as its 
territory, and, in Moscow's eyes, part of Ukraine only as a result of "illegal" transfer by Khrush-
chev in 1954,71 but it is strategically important as a base for the Russian navy. The Black Sea 
Fleet has been based on the peninsula since it was founded by Potemkin in 1783, and remains 
crucial to Russian security interests in the region.72 Russia's capacity to reach the sea is limited 
by geography, and Sevastopol is Russia's only warm water base.73 Obviously, NATO member 
states cannot have a Russian military base on their soil; thus, if Ukraine joins NATO, Moscow 
will lose its fleet - something, the Kremlin, or any other power, cannot accept.74 If NATO can 
place its navy on the peninsula, the Alliance's ability to threaten territorial integrity of Russia 
will increase drastically. 
 Finally, Russia views NATO as a military alliance with offensive intentions due to the 
Alliance’s constant enlargement and the fact that it was not dissolved after the end of the Cold 
War. Russian officials declare that NATO should have been disbanded or Russia should have 
been accepted as a member of the Alliance. Moscow does not stop repeating that, after the reuni-
fication of Germany in 1990, the Western leaders made promises to Mikhail Gorbachev that they 
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would not expand NATO eastward. Russian diplomats regularly assert that Washington made 
such a promise in exchange for the Soviet troop withdrawal from East Germany.75 Today, most 
of the Western literature declare that this promise was never made. Yet, a number of the formerly 
secret documents from 1989 and 199076 and articles such as "Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, 
Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO En-
largement in February 1990" by Mary Elise Sarotte prove different.77 
 Thus, according to the neorealist school of thought, Russia has every reason to perceive 
possible NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia as threatening for Moscow’s security inter-
ests. The next part of this thesis shows what Russia’s balancing strategies towards NATO’s en-
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 I set out to prove that Russia's military interference to protect Russian citizens and com-
patriots residing in Georgia and Ukraine is a way to balance NATO expansion. This is particu-
larly relevant for states that Moscow perceives as strategically important. To that end, I first de-
scribe Soviet balancing strategies towards NATO. Second, I examine Russia's balancing strategy 
towards the Alliance after the end of the Cold War, followed by elaboration of the NATO bomb-
ing of Yugoslavia of 1999 as a turning point of Russia-West relations. Third, I describe Mos-
cow's balancing strategy towards NATO after the Kosovo crisis until the Russian-Georgian war 
of August 2008. Fourth, I analyze the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia as the first 
clear signal of Russian balancing against NATO expansion through the use of force.  
Finally, I explain why the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis is the latest example of such 
Moscow's military balancing strategy. In both cases, protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-
speakers living in Georgia and Ukraine is the official reason for the Kremlin's military interven-
tions. Yet, this work shows that the root cause of Moscow’s interventions in these two states is 
the Kremlin’s perception of NATO’s enlargement as threatening.  
 
5.1	SOVIET	BALANCING	STRATEGY	TOWARDS	NATO,	1949	-	1991	
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into existence in 1949 and was born from 
the threat of Soviet imperialism,78 or as Duignan puts it "to keep the Russians out, the Germans 
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down, and the Americans in Europe."79 According to the Alliance's official website, NATO’s es-
sential purpose is to "safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and 
military means."80 The heart of NATO is expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in 
which the signatory members agree that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."81 
 In 1955, as a way to counterbalance NATO, the Soviet Union and its affiliated Com-
munist nations in Eastern Europe founded the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the history of the Cold 
War is largely a history of two alliances balancing each other, with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962 offering a well-known example of the threat perception and balancing strategies. Ulti-
mately, the Cuban Missile Crisis became one of the most dangerous confrontations between the 
United States and the USSR during the Cold War. The US balanced against the deployment of 
Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba, which would have than allowed Soviet missiles to reach and 
destroy Washington. From the US perspective, the Soviet move was both a provocation and a 
threat. However, this was a direct response to the US actions just three years earlier, when, in 
1959, they installed nuclear missiles in Turkey. This aggressive action was perceived by the 
Kremlin as a security threat, which Moscow counterbalanced against by deploying missiles to 
Cuba.  
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 I argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis is reminiscent of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 
and the present Ukrainian crisis: in all three cases, Moscow warned Washington about its secu-
rity concerns regarding US actions, which the Kremlin perceived as offensive. The United States 
did not take these complaints seriously, but instead perceived further Soviet/Russian actions as 
aggressive.82 These aggressions and perceptions led to heightened tensions between the nations. 
 Still, during the Cold War, instead of confronting each other openly and directly, the So-
viet Union and the United States mostly chose to oppose each other through intermediary third 
parties, leading to numerous proxy wars. The Chinese Civil War, the Greek Civil War, the Suez 
Crisis, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict are just a few examples of proxy balancing during the Cold 
War. Despite these tensions, numerous agreements between Moscow and Washington were ar-
ranged over the deployment of troops along each respective power centers’ borders. Respecting 
these agreements allowed for the maintenance of international peace and stability. 
 With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the situation drastically changed. No state or alli-
ance of states was able to counterbalance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, the 
world turned out to be unipolar, with the USA becoming an unwavering world leader for decades 
to come.  
 
5.2	RUSSIA'S	BALANCING	STRATEGY	TOWARDS	NATO,	1991-2000.	KOSOVO 
 After the end of the Cold War, Russia found itself in a political, economic, and social cri-
sis. It was reduced to its smallest size since before the reign of Catherine the Great and even lost 
Ukraine, the original heartland of Kievan Rus.83 Robert D. Kaplan declared that it never before 
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in peacetime was Russia as geographically vulnerable as it was after the breakup of the USSR.84 
Despite having inherited the Soviet nuclear weapons and permanent membership in the United 
Nations Security Council, the Russian Federation lost its position as a super power and was not 
invited to join elite Western institutions.85 Moscow believed that it should be treated as equal by 
the West, particularly Washington, and refused to adjust to this rapid decline in its status. 
 In 1994, the first Russia-NATO crisis occurred during the Sarajevo crisis, when NATO 
threatened air strikes in response to the market-place mortar explosion.86 The same year the se-
cond Russia-NATO crisis happened, when Washington decided to enlarge the Alliance to in-
clude former members of the Warsaw Pact. In both situations, Moscow did not have any say in 
what it saw as interference in its historic spheres of influence. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's 
press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, announced that "Russia's romantic embrace of the West 
was over, and that Russia increasingly saw itself as a great power with strategic interests differ-
ent from those of the United States and Europe."87 Yet, Russia was too weak and financially de-
pendent on the West to challenge NATO. 
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 The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was the major turning point for the Kremlin: 
Russia came to believe that it "no longer mattered to the West, and Washington, for all its rheto-
ric about a cooperative world order, was making geopolitical gains at Russia's expense."88 Dur-
ing the Kosovo crisis and until this day, Russia has held a very strong position against the NATO 
intervention. The Kosovo episode has turned into a paradigmatic and referential event shaping 
the foundations of the current Russia-West relations.89 
 Russia perceived NATO intervention that way because, first, the Kremlin concluded that 
NATO's role was changing. Serbia was not a member of the Alliance, and NATO acted outside 
its immediate area of responsibility. Second, the Kosovo crisis not only showed that the interna-
tional community allowed settling of the national conflict without the Security Council authori-
zation, but NATO did not hesitate to threaten "an intractable" country with the Alliance's mili-
tary capabilities.90 Russian Foreign Minister, Ivanov, stated that the Balkan region had been cho-
sen to road-test "a NATO-centrist" concept of world order, in which a group of states would 
claim the right to dictate, by force if needed, its will to the international community.91  
 Finally, the Balkans has always been a zone of special strategic interest for Moscow. 
Even today, Serbia is often called the last Russian ally in Europe. NATO intervention happened 
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just a few days after NATO's New Strategic Concept was stated and three new members - the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary - joined the Alliance.  
 Thus, Moscow's general assessment of the conflict was that NATO was a growing alli-
ance militarily interfering in the sovereign state. Moreover, NATO humanitarian intervention 
was an attempt to drive Russia out of the region92 and challenge its sphere of influence. The 
Kremlin concluded that the bombing would never have happened if the Soviet Union did not 
break up. Further, a popular belief that Russia itself was vulnerable to NATO intervention was 
captured in the alarmist catchphrase "Serbia today, Russia tomorrow."93 
 Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President at the time, angrily spoke of "naked aggression" of 
the West against Serbia and announced that adequate measures, including military ones, would 
be taken by Russia to "defend itself and the overall security of Europe," if the situation in Ko-
sovo were to worsen.94 Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of General Staff, considered a number of mili-
tary steps and "did not rule out the possibility of Russia's using nuclear weapons to defend the 
country's territorial integrity."95 Other military representatives also announced that the Russian 
forces would immediately be put in a state of alert.  
 Yet, it soon became obvious that the rage in Moscow had no effect on the policies of the 
West. Russia withdrew its mission to NATO and suspended participation in the Permanent Joint 
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Council (external nonmilitary balancing). Yet, on the wider diplomatic front, the Russian gov-
ernment maintained normal diplomatic relations with all members of the Alliance, including the 
US. Thus, even though Russia's interests were directly affected by the Yugoslav crisis, Russia's 
balancing strategy consisted of almost nothing but loud statements and warnings.  
 
5.3	RUSSIA'S	BALANCING	STRATEGY	TOWARDS	NATO,	2000-2008		
 In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power. President Putin's principal foreign policy goal 
was to restore Russia's great power status.96 In the beginning of his presidency, Putin continued 
using a soft balancing strategy towards the West and even made several unilateral concessions 
indicating that the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Russian Federation was 
over. For example, he accepted US bases in Central Asia (part of Russia's traditional sphere of 
influence), softly reacted to the US withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile treaty (one of the 
few remaining symbols of Russian/Western equality), and accepted the creation of the NATO-
Russia Council as a vehicle for cooperation, although it did not give Russia a vote.97  
 Yet, the US-Russian partnership did not last. Although Putin expected Russia to be 
treated by the West as an equal partner, he soon concluded that Washington did not regard Mos-
cow as such.98 For the latter, it became especially obvious during the "color" revolutions in 
Georgia (the Rose Revolution of 2003), Ukraine (the Orange Revolution of 2004), and Kyrgyz-
                                                
96 Larson and Shevchenko, "Status Seekers," 88. 




stan (the Tulip Revolution of 2005). In the United States, all three were not only strongly sup-
ported, but financed.99 In Russia, they were perceived as unlawful regime changes and a humili-
ating interference in Russia's backyard. Furthermore, in 2004, three former Soviet republics—
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—became NATO members.100 Hence, the Alliance’s military facili-
ties and armed forces could be brought right on the Russian border. 
 Right after the first "color" revolution took place, Russia switched to much more coercive 
diplomacy against its neighboring states in order to prevent further expansion of the European 
Union and NATO into what Moscow considered to be its natural sphere of influence. There are 
several example of that coercive diplomacy. First, starting in 2005, Russia used "gas pipeline di-
plomacy" against Ukraine, increasing gas prices which Ukraine could not afford and conse-
quently cutting gas supplies. Second, after the Estonian government removed the Bronze Soldier 
Soviet war memorial from central Tallinn in 2007, cyber-attacks against Estonia were carried 
out.101  
 At the same time, Russia's policies towards its diasporas abroad, launched in the 1990s, 
gained their momentum.102 According to Agnia Grigas, one of the most arguable policies related 
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to Russia’s compatriots in post-Soviet states, particularly Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, be-
came Moscow’s "passportization" policy —"the systemic distribution of Russian passports and 
citizenship to ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities residing in particular terri-
tories of foreign states, often on the border with the Russian Federation."103 The history showed 
that, soon after passportization occurred, calls for the protection of "these newly minted Russian 
citizens" in these countries would follow.104 
 Russia’s passportization policies were not unknown to the governments of the post-So-
viet states. As such, in the early 2000s, representatives of Crimean Tatars presented evidence that 
Russian consulates in Simferopol and Sevastopol were massively handing out Russian citizen-
ship,105 even though the Ukrainian Law on Citizenship forbids dual citizenship. A similar situa-
tion happened in Georgia: the majority of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians were granted Rus-
sian citizenship in the early 2000s.106 At least in Crimea, ethnic Russians constituted sixty five 
percent of the population, while only two percent of the population in South Ossetia identified 
themselves as ethnic Russians. Russia's passportization policy took place regardless of the eth-
nicity of the population but rather according to Moscow's security concerns.   
 In February 2008, the West recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence 
without the UN approval, right away triggering Russian Duma to adopt a resolution, in which it 
called in the Russian President and the government to consider the recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. About the same time, the United States decided to place an antiballistic missile 
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system in Poland and the Czech Republic. NATO asserted that the system would protect against 
Iran, but Russia thought differently and called it a direct threat. Defense experts declared that 
there was "little doubt that the real target of the shield" was Russia."107 Russia's leading expert on 
antiballistic weaponry, General Vladimir Belous, stated that "The geography of the deployment 
doesn't give any doubt the main targets are Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. The US bases 
represent a real threat to our strategic nuclear forces."108 Moreover, the antiballistic missile sys-
tem could be quickly converted to deploy strike systems, in particular land-based cruise mis-
siles.109 Moscow responded to the situation according to the categorization of the four different 
balancing strategies shaped by the level of threat perception regarding the state's adversary and 
the Kremlin's balancing strategy started to include the threat and use of military force.110  
 The Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia was the first clear signal of Russian bal-
ancing against NATO expansion not through the "soft balancing" of diplomatic statements, but 
through the use of force (positive military balancing).111 The present Russian-Ukrainian crisis is 
the latest example of such military balancing strategy. In both cases, protection of Russian mi-
norities residing in Georgia and Ukraine was the official reason for the Kremlin's interventions. 
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"Russian citizens being attacked is an attack against the Russian Federation. If we are attacked, we 
would certainly respond. If our interests, our legitimate interests, the interests of Russians have been at-
tacked directly, like they were in South Ossetia for example, I do not see any other way but to respond in 
accordance with international law."112 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
 
 "I must protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are. We will not allow their deaths 
to go unpunished. Those responsible will receive a deserved punishment."113 
President Dmitry Medvedev (about the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia) 
 
  
 NATO relations with Georgia started shortly after the end of the Cold War. Georgia joined 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994.114 At the 
Bucharest Summit in 2008, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the 
North Atlantic Alliance agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO.  
 At the same Summit, Vladimir Putin gave a speech calling the enlargement of the Alliance 
"a direct threat to Russia."115 Russia's President declared that NATO should not ensure its security 
at the expense of the security of other countries and that NATO, being a military alliance, should 
display restraint in the military sphere. Moreover, if NATO continued approaching the Russian 
borders, Moscow would take "necessary measures."116.  
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 The Bucharest Summit took place from the 2nd to the 4th of April. The Russian-Georgian 
War started four months later, on August 7, 2008. Georgia and the West describe the war and the 
events leading to it in one light, Russia in another. The former side talks about Russia's aggression 
and military intervention in the sovereign state, the latter - about the Georgian aggression and 
Russia's right to protect its citizens abroad. Yet, from whichever side one looks at the conflict, it 
can be seen that the increase in the level of threat perception caused Russia and Georgia to choose 
balancing strategies. 
 A diplomatic crisis between Russia and Georgia preceded the Five-Day War. Right after 
the Bucharest Summit, as a direct response to NATO's promising Georgia to become an Alliance 
member, Russia lifted sanctions imposed on Abkhazia by the Commonwealth of Independent 
States in 1996, and began to cooperate fully with the governments of the breakaway regions (pos-
itive nonmilitary balancing). Later in April, Moscow increased the number of Russian peacekeep-
ing troops in Abkhazia (negative military balancing).117 By early July 2008, the area became in-
creasingly militarized. The Georgian side took part in the US-led military exercises near Tbilisi, 
while the Russian one began its own exercises next to the Georgian border (internal military bal-
ancing).118 While a delegation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was 
visiting Georgia and one day before US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived to Georgia, 
four Russian military aircrafts entered Georgian airspace. While the Georgian Foreign Minister 
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called it an act of "open aggression," the Kremlin declared that the overflight was intended to deter 
a possible Georgian offense.119  
 Starting on August 1st, serious clashes occurred between Georgian troops and Ossetian 
separatist militias. On August 7th, an open combat broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia, 
which rapidly escalated into the full scale war between Georgian and Russian troops.  
 The Russian and Georgian descriptions of the events of those days differ widely and are 
highly politicized.120 In September 2009, a report from an EU fact-finding mission determined that 
the 2008 war was caused by Georgia's illegal attack on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali.121 
At the same time, the commission stated that Russia's issuing of its passports to the populations of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia violated international law.122 However, despite who or what triggered 
the conflict, Russia was motivated for intervention in Georgia by its loss of influence over it – 
Moscow’s historic sphere of influence and a protective buffer zone. Furthermore, NATO was mov-
ing right next to Russia's borders. By declaring that Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia were in danger, Russia militarily intervened in Georgia. Russia's intervention in Georgia 
was meant to be a lesson for other post-Soviet states, particularly Ukraine, which chose to turn to 
the West. As Lilia Shevtsova puts it in her book Lonely Power: "Georgia had to become the whip-
ping boy" as a reminder that the Kremlin could neither be ignored nor challenged.123  
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	 "When the infrastructure of a military bloc is moving toward our borders, it causes us some con-
cerns and questions. We need to take some steps in response...NATO ships would have ended up in the 
city of Russian navy glory, Sevastopol."124 
Vladimir Putin (about the Crimea annexation)  
  
 After the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia, political analysts warned Kiev that 
it was the next in line to be punished by the Kremlin for its Western aspirations. Indeed, the cur-
rent Ukrainian crisis in many ways resembles the conflict between Russia and Georgia six years 
earlier. As in the Georgian case, dialogue and cooperation between Ukraine and NATO started 
after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Coop-
eration Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace programme three years later, in 1994.125 
Yet, even though Kiev sent troops to support the Alliance in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nature of 
the partnership remained loose.126 
 By 2008, the relations between Russia and Ukraine had deteriorated. The worsening of 
relationships between the two countries started in 2004, after the Orange Revolution took place 
and pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko came to power. The Kremlin declared that the protests, 
which led to the “color” revolution, were a scam orchestrated by the West and financed by the 
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United States.127 The Yushchenko presidency and his personal commitment to integrate Kiev 
into the EU and NATO threatened Moscow. As a result, one can see a much more coercive di-
plomacy towards Ukraine carried out by the Kremlin starting from the beginning of Yushchen-
ko's presidency in 2005. Regular gas disputes became Russia's strategy to keep Ukraine under its 
sphere of influence (negative nonmilitary balancing).  
  At the same time, public statements made by both Russian and Ukrainian politicians 
were growing increasingly hostile. On many occasions, Kiev stated that it planned to join the EU 
and NATO, while Russia threatened that these actions would lead to consequences. As such, in 
June 2006, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, directly warned Ukraine not to join NATO. 
He stated that the former Soviet states could decide their own fate, but their entry into the Alli-
ance would constitute a "colossal geopolitical shift for Russia."128 At the same time, the Russian 
parliament passed a resolution which declared that "Ukraine's accession to the military bloc will 
lead to very negative consequences for relations between our fraternal peoples."129 
 At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, President Putin told President Bush that "Ukraine is 
not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a 
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gift from us."130 At this same Summit, the Heads of State and Government of the member coun-
tries of the North Atlantic Alliance would agree that Ukraine, together with Georgia, would be-
come members of NATO.131  
 After the 2008 Summit, when the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia took place, 
Kiev fully supported Tbilisi, condemned the Kremlin's military intervention, and, until the end of 
Yushchenko's presidency in 2010, sought EU and NATO membership. The same year, Kiev de-
clared that it would not renew the lease of Russia's Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol when it 
expired in 2017,132 causing the security danger Moscow would not tolerate.  
 In 2010, pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was elected the new Ukrainian President, and 
Kiev's hopes of joining NATO ended. Yanukovych announced that he did not see a need for further 
integration with the Alliance. Ukraine's parliament passed a bill that confirmed the country's non-
aligned status and effectively canceled any prospect of joining NATO.133 Moreover, Russian na-
vy's lease got extended from 2017 to 2042.134 As a result, the relations between Russia and Ukraine 
softened. Yet, Yanukovych did not fully stop Ukrainian integration with the West, but rather tried 
to pursue a balance between strengthening Ukraine’s integration with Europe while maintaining a 
positive relationship with Russia.  
                                                
130 James Marson, "Putin to the West: Hands off Ukraine," Time, May 25, 2009, accessed De-
cember 8, 2016, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900838,00.html . 
131 Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO Official Website, April 3, 2008, accessed December 8, 
2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm . 
132 Yuhas and Jalabi, "Ukraine Crisis." 
133 Taylor, "That Time."  
134 Yuhas and Jalabi, "Ukraine Crisis." 
 
42 
By the end of 2013, Kiev had to decide if it would sign the EU Association Agreement or 
stay under Moscow's orbit. Perceiving the Association Agreement as a pathway to future NATO 
membership,135 Moscow warned that if Kiev signed the document, Ukraine would face "inevitable 
financial catastrophe and possibly the collapse of the state."136 The Kremlin directly threatened 
Kiev with the possibility of stirring up separatist movements in the Russian-speaking east and 
south of the country.137 Moscow declared that if Ukraine continued with the Agreement, Russia 
would consider the bilateral treaty that delineates the countries' borders to be void.138 By that time, 
Russia already placed some import restrictions on many Ukrainian products (from steel pipes to 
cheese and confectionery) and threatened more sanctions if the free trade agreement with the EU 
was signed (negative nonmilitary balancing). This "trade war" cost Kiev billions of dollars.139 
 What happened next became history: to the surprise of experts and the public, on Novem-
ber 21, 2013, the Ukrainian government declared that they suspended preparations for signing 
the Association Agreement with the EU and were reviving economic ties with Moscow, which 
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promised Kiev a lavish bailout package of $20 billion and cheap gas (positive nonmilitary bal-
ancing).140 In reaction to this, protesters flooded Kiev. Yet, in Moscow's eyes, those protests 
were engineered by Washington to move NATO closer to Russia's borders, and, once they led to 
the sudden overthrow of the Ukrainian President on February 22, 2014, it was a clear sign that 
Moscow was losing power in its sphere of influence.141 Not only did Victoria Nuland, the US as-
sistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, and Republican Senator John 
McCain participate in Ukraine's antigovernment demonstrations,142 but also "American envoys 
offered Ukraine’s interim government $25 billion to place missile defenses on the Russian bor-
der."143 Russia had no choice but to act.  
 After Moscow's strategic economic aid to Kiev (positive nonmilitary balancing) did not 
bring the desired outcome, the Kremlin provided teams of Russian police and secret service of-
ficers to support the pro-Kremlin government in Kiev (negative military balancing).144 When 
Russia's perception of threat reached its highest point, Russia occupied the Crimea where its eth-
nic minority was living (positive military balancing). 
 One of the clear signs that Russia was not aggressive, but defensive, is the timing. The 
Ukrainian crisis was unfolding when the eyes of the international community were turned on 
Moscow: the protests in Kiev coincided with Russia's Winter Olympics of 2014, where Putin 
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44 
was celebrating with more than fifty presidents and prime ministers from around the world.145 As 
Henry Kissinger famously declared, "It is not conceivable that Putin spends 60 billion Euros on 
turning a summer resort into a winter Olympic village in order to start a military crisis the week 
after a concluding ceremony that depicted Russia as a part of Western civilization."146 Kissinger 
is correct to point out that if Russia wanted to initiate a conflict with Ukraine, it would have cho-
sen a different moment. Bearing in mind that the Crimean parliament had voted more than once 
for greater autonomy and even independence from Ukraine and Russia’s parliament had also 
voted to declare Sevastopol a Russian city well before March 2014,147 Moscow was forced to re-
act and it had to do it at a very uncomfortable time for itself. 
As in the case of 2008 military intervention in Georgia, during the current Ukrainian cri-
sis, Russia responded to the situation according to the categorization of the four different balanc-
ing strategies shaped by the level of threat perception regarding the state's adversary. After nei-
ther negative nor positive nonmilitary balancing strategies brought the desired outcome, Moscow 
had to adhere to the last resort - use of military force. Russia's "soft power" changed to "hard 
power." On March 1st, 2014, the upper house of the parliament of the Russian Federation unani-
mously authorized President Putin to resort to armed intervention in Ukraine in order to protect 
Russia's citizens and compatriots abroad.148  
                                                
145 Graham Allison, "U.S.-Russia Relations: What Would Henry Kissinger Do?" The National 
Interest, September 28, 2015, accessed December 8, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-russia-
relations-what-would-henry-kissinger-do-13953 . 
146 Ibid. 
147 Serge Schmemann, "Russian Parliament Votes a Claim to Ukrainian Port of Sevastopol," New 
York Times, July 10, 1993, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.ny-
times.com/1993/07/10/world/russian-parliament- votes-a-claim-to-ukrainian-port-of-sevasto-
pol.html. 
148 Delwaide, "Identity and Geopolitics," 179. 
 
45 
The case of Crimea annexation clearly shows that, when states are exposed to great 
threats, they are more likely to weight the effectiveness over the cost of balancing strategies. The 
possibility of Ukraine’s new government joining NATO was intolerable for the Kremlin. NATO 
membership for Ukraine would be regarded by Moscow as "a catastrophe of epochal propor-
tions" and a challenge to Russian vital interests, the most specific of these would be to Russia's 
control of the Black Sea Fleet base.149 This clearly explains why Crimea was annexed, regardless 
of the cost of balancing strategy, which came to include economic sanctions, international isola-
tion, the "reinvigoration" of NATO, and the alienation of most of the Ukrainian, if not European, 
population.150 In this light, the Kremlin's present day diplomatic, economic and military support 
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 Russia’s balancing strategies towards NATO expansion illustrate a larger phenomenon. 
When a military alliance expands next to the borders of a non-member-state, the latter feels threat-
ened and attempts to respond. States normally do not want to provoke their rivals by military 
means, particularly great powers, and pursue costly balancing policies only when they are forced 
to counter significant external threats.151 Thus, the first step the threatened state is likely to make, 
is to pursue nonmilitary means, such as coercive diplomacy, in order to prevent the enlargement. 
If a military alliance continues to expand into what this state considers to be its natural sphere of 
influence, the state's strategy might start including positive military balancing, such as military 
buildup and even the use of force.  
 Since the end of the Cold War, the West has been indifferent to Russia's fears of NATO 
enlargement. After Moscow's "soft" balancing strategy towards NATO of the 1990s and the be-
ginning of 2000s did not bring the desired outcome, the Kremlin turned to much more coercive 
policies towards its neighboring states, which sought NATO membership. In this light, the Five-
Day War between Russia and Georgia of August 2008 and the current Ukrainian crisis are conse-
quences, not causes, of Russia's conflict with the West. 
 Even though NATO assures the Kremlin, that neither the Alliance's policies nor its actions 
are a threat to Russia,152 as John Mearshimer once famously put it, in the end, "it is the Russians, 
                                                
151 Paul Fritz and Kevin Sweeney, "The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power Theory," Interna-
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not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them."153 Russia feels threat-
ened by NATO expansion and wants to secure the buffer zone around itself. In this light, Moscow's 
perception of NATO as threatening is the root cause of Russia’s balancing strategies regarding 
Russian minorities living abroad; and Russia's military interference to protect Russian citizens and 
compatriots residing in former Soviet states is a way to balance NATO expansion into states that 
Russia perceives as strategically important. 
 The 2008 Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia and the current Ukrainian crisis show 
how important it is, in order to keep regional peace and avoid military conflicts, to take other states' 
complaints and perceptions seriously. When insecurity is the root cause of a state’s aggressive 
actions, making more threats just worsens the situation. The proper response should be addressing 
the insecurities that are motivating the threatened state's behavior. The Ukrainian crisis started 
with the West trying to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit. What happened later was Moscow's 
response. Thus, today, when Russia clearly perceives NATO expansion as a threat to national 
security, the West should neither push for further integration of post-Soviet states into its military 
alliance nor indulge NATO aspirations of the states which Russia sees as strategically important. 
Rather, the alliance should find a new framework to cooperate with Russia as equal partners; and 
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